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THE LAW OF DOMICILE IN CONNECTION WITH THE
RIGHT OF SUCCESSION TO BOTH PERSONAL AND
REAL ESTATE.
THE question of domicile has of late years assumed an import-
ance, resulting from the increased international relations of differ-
ent countries and the facilities of locomotion, that is likely seriously
to complicate family surroundings, unless a clear and -distinct rule
of interpretation is speedily accepted and acted upon, based upon
the principle of the comity of nations, but which as yet remains to
be formulated. In a case recently decided in England, Re Good-
man'8 Trusts, Law Rep., 14 Chan. Div. 19, June 12th 1880, it was
held, that a child illegitimate according to English law, but who
was legitimate according to the law of its domicile, and of its
parents' domicile, cannot take under the Act of Distributions as
one of the next of kin of an intestate dying, domiciled in England-
the word "children" in the statute meaning, children according
to the English law.
Such was the decision of Sir GEORGE JESSEL, M. R., but that
decision has been since overruled, upon appeal, Law Rep., 17 Ch.
Div. 266 (April 13th 1881), COTTON and JAMES, L.JJ., dissenting
from, and LusH, L.J., agreeing with the judgment of the Master of
the Rolls. The property in dispute being but small, it is doubtful
whether the case will be carried further, though it is very desirable
that it should be. The decision of the court below seems to be fully
sanctioned by precedents, for to say nothing of the dicta of Sir W.
PAGE WooD, V. C., in B2oyes v. Bedale, 1 H. & M. 79; and in Re
Wison's Trusts, per KNDERSLEY, V. C., both of which are referred
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to by Sir G. JESSEL in his judgment; numerous cases, including
Somerville v. Somerville, 5 Yes. 754, and Gambier v. Gambier, 7
Sim. 263, are in accord. The rule, in fact, hitherto recognised,
seems to be that stated by Mr. Burge, viz., that if the law of domicile
exclude those who are not born in lawful wedlock, those who are
legitimated by the subsequent marriage of their parents, are not
admissible to the succession. It follows, therefore, that the law
which has conferred on them legitimacy, must yield to that which
governs the succession; and the law of the domicile of the deceased,
will defeat the claim to the personal estate as effectually as the ex-
istence of a similar law in loco rei sitte would defeat the claim to
real estate. The result of the judicial decisions is, that the status
of legitimacy or illegitimacy, or the capacity to become legitimate
per subsequens matrimonium, is governed by the law of the domi-
cile of origin; yet, if the legitimacy be not that which the lex loci
rei sitce or the lex domicilii requires in those whom it admits to the
succession, it will not entitle the person to the succession. The
law of the domicile of origin must yield to that of the situs of
real property, or to that of the domicile of the deceased, according
to the nature of the property which is the subject of litigation:
1 Burge on Foreign Law 111, 112.
By an order of STUART, V. C., made July 1862, in Goodman
v. Goodman, 3 Gif. 643, a case arising out of a will in the same
family, but under different circumstances of domicile, it was declared
that, it appearing that the then testator was domiciled in Holland,
where the law of legitimation per subsequens matrimonium was
recognised, a child legitimated by her parents' post-natal marriage
could take a share in the legacy bequeathed to "children." By
-way of illustration, and to show that the rule as above, viz. : the law
conferring legitimacy on ante-nati children, must yield to that
which governs the succession, is not confined to England alone,
a domiciled Englishman, being the putative father of an illegiti-
mate child, born in France of a French woman, and afterwards
becoming domiciled in France, cannot, on his subsequent marriage
with the mother of the child, legitimize the child under the
French law, so as to enable it to share in a bequest to his children
contained in the will of a person in England. In re Wright, 2
Kay & J. 595.; 2 Jur. N. S. 465; 25 L. J. Chan. 621.
The reasons of this are, first, that marriage, being a personal
contract, is like other personal contracts, regulated by the law of
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the domicile of the party; secondly, that the law of the domicile
of the putative father attached to the child at its birth, and by that
law its bastardy was indelible; thirdly, that by the law of France,
a bastard cannot afterwards be made legitimate, if, at the time of
its conception, the parents were incapable of contracting to legiti-
mize the child after its birth, and a domiciled Englishman, by the
laws of his country, cannot, for civil purposes, be more than the
putative father of a bastard child: Be Wright, 2 Kay & J. 595;
2 Jur. N. S. 465; 25 L. J. Chan. 621. Thus, it is seen, the
French law, though recognising legitimation per 8ubsequens matri-
m onium, only recognises it sub modo ; i. e., only so far as it does
not contravene the doctrine of the lex loci domicilii. A child may,
therefore, be legitimate in the abstract, such legitimacy being
governed by the domicile of origin, yet it may not be the legiti-
macy which the lex loci rei sitte or the lex loci domicili requires
for the purpose of inheritance or succession. It may here be
remarked that by the law of Scotland, legitimation per ubsequens
matrimonium operates only from the time of the marriage, not
from the time of the birth: Shedden v. Patrick, 1 Macq. H. L.
Cas. 535. It will thus be seen that there are difficulties in apply-
ing the law so as to meet the comity of nations. As was said by
Sir 0. ORESSWELL, in Simonin v. Mallac, 2 Sw. & Tr. 67 (the
case of a marriage in England between two fbreigners) : "What
right has one independent nation to call upon another nation to
surrender its own laws in order to give effect ?" &c. "If there be
any such law, it must be found in the law of nations, that law ' to
which all nations have consented, or to which they must be pre-
sumed to consent, for the common benefit and advantage.' * * *
Which law is to prevail? To which country is an English tri-
bunal to pay the compliment of adopting its law ? As far as the
law of nations is concerned, each must have an equal right to
claim respect for its laws. Both cannot be observed; would it not
then be more just, and therefore more for the interest of all, that
the law of that country should prevail which both are assumed to
know and to agree to be bound by ?" (The learned judge, it should
be remembered, is here speaking of marriage, for the validity of
which contract no special domicile is required by the English law;
but, mutatis mutandfs, the reasoning is equally applicable to legiti-
macy.) "If once the principle of surrendering our own law to
that of a foreign country is recognised, it would- be followed with
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all its consequences, the cases put are therefore a fair test as to the
possibility of maintaining that by any comitas or jus gentium, this
court is bound to adopt the law of France as its guide."
Sir JAmEs HANNEN, President of the Court of Matrimonial
Causes and Legitimacy, says, in Sottomayor v. DeBarras, reported
in Law Rep., 2 P. D. 81, and vol. 5, 94; also in 19 American
Law Reg. (N. S.) 76, after referring to Sir C. CRESSWELL'S
remarks just cited: "But on what principle are our courts to
refuse recognition if not on the basis of our own laws ? What
have we to do, or, to be more correct, what have the English tri-
bunals to do with what may be thought in other countries on such
a subject ?" This reasoning applies equally to any other country as
to England, and as the laws of legitimacy differ in different
countries, the comitas of nations involves special and intricate
investigations. Assuming the legitimacy, the question is whether
that status, that character, entitles the person so designated to the
rights and privileges of the law of the domicile of the deceased,
such domicile not admitting the doctrine of legitimation per subse-
quens matrimonium.
We are not now discussing the question of indelibility of ille-
gitimacy, but whether a child legitimized by a post-natal marriage,
can take, under the'English Statute of Distributions, as one of the
next of kin of an intestate dying domiciled in England. Could
he do so in New York? It is not a question of the domicile of
origin, nor yet that of the parents per se, nor even that of the
place where the marriage took place, but that of an intestate who
might, or might not, be the parent upon the occasion. We have
seen, in Re Viright (supra), that, according to the law of France,
a child born in France of a domiciled Englishman, cannot share in
a bequest to his children contained in the will of a person in Eng-
land, neither can it be legitimated per subsequens matrimonium,
although such legitimation is, as a rule, admitted by French law.
It follows upon the same principle that it could not take as next of
kin of an intestate. In this case the law of England seems to be
respected and acted upon almost to an extreme. The law of New
York not admitting the doctrine of legitimation per subsequents
matrimonium within its- own state (Shedden v. Patrick, supra),
could it so contravene the principle of the lex loci domicilii as to
admit a child so legitimized to participate either in a bequest to
"children" or as one of the next of kin of an intestate, the tes-
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tator or intestate being domiciled in the state of New York? In
England, the liability to succession and legacy duty is governed
by the law of the place of domicile: Callanane v. Campbell, 24
L. T. R. (N. S.) 175, M. R.
In the case of real property, the lex loci rei sito governs the
right to inherit, as was said by ALEXANDER, 0. B., in Doed. Birt-
whistle v. Vardill, 5 B. & C. 438 ; 8 D. & R. 185 ; 9 Bligh N. S.
72-78; 2 Cl. & Fin. 592-98: "While we assume that B. is the
eldest legitimate son of his father in England as well as in Scot-
land, we think that we have also to consider whether that status,
that character, entitles him to the land in dispute as the heir of that
father? And we think that this question, inasmuch as it regards
real property situated in England, must be decided accord-
ing to those rules which govern the descent of real property in
that country, without the least regard to those rules which govern
the descent of real property in Scotland." So in respect of the
American Union, the law of the state in which a deceased was domi-
ciled must govern the distribution and succession to personal pro-
perty, and the law of the situs of real property must govern the
right of inheritance. It is not so much a question of legitimacy
or illegitimacy in the abstract, as that of the law of domicile, or
that of the situs of real property according to the nature of the
property which is the subject of litigation. For instance, should
the law of primogeniture prevail in the country of the situs,
though not in the country of a domicile of origin, the law of pri-
mogeniture would attach, and vice versa.
The words "children" in a statute regulating succession, or
"the next of kin" of an intestate, or "the heirs" of a deceased,
must, it would appear, be construed according to the meaning
which attaches in the domicile of the deceascd. Thus, a person who
is not born in lawful wedlock cannot, by the common law of Eng-
land, inherit land. The celebrated reply of the lords contained in
the Statute of Merton (20 Henry III., c. 9), in answer to the
attempt of the bishops to introduce legitimation per subsequens
matrimonium, with one voice proclaimed "Nolumus leges Anglia.
mutare quce hucusque usitatm sunt et approbatte." See 2 Inst.
96 ; Preface to 5 Rep. .11 and 12; 12 Rep. 72.
This point, decided. in -Doe d. Birtwhistle v. 'ardill, 5 B. & C.
438 ; s. a. 8 D. & R. 185, was based upon the ground that though
the validity of the marriage was to be determined by the lex loci con-
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tractus, the right of the issue to inherit land in England depended
on the lex loci rei sitce; that English land was not inheritable by
every legitimate child, but only by a child legitimate sub modo,
viz. : born after wedlock; and that the Statute of Merton, which
declares "he is a bastard that is born before the marriage of his
parents," was not restricted to those born in England. The case,
upon appeal, having been a second time argued in the House of
Lords, TINDAL, 0. J., delivered the unanimous opinion of the
judges, as follows : " This opinion," he said, "rested on the rule
or maxim of the law of England, that the son, in order to succeed
as heir, must be born after the actual marriage of' his father and
mother; this was a rule regulating the descent of real property,
which could not be disturbed by the laws of the country where
the party was born, and which may be allowed to govern his per-
sonal status by the comity of nations." Lord BROUGHA.1 de-
clared that the doubts which he had entertained when the case was
before the House on a former occasion, had not been removed.
See 9 Bligh N. S. 72, 78; 2 01. & Fin. 582, 598. The privi-
leges, he said, granted by the common law to the bastard eigne,
favored the doctrine that the status of the person once established,
the title to inheritance followed. The judgment of the court
below was affirmed 10th August 1840: 1 Robinson's Appeal C.
627, 652. Whatever might have been the common-law privileges
of the bastard eigne and mulier puisne, they appear to have been
destroyed by the statute 8 & 4 Wim. 4, c. 27, s. 89, which enacts
that "no descent cast shall defeat any right of entry," and at all
events the analogy drawn by Lord BROUGHAM appears not only
exceptional but inconsistent with the legal maxim: "lITobilia per-
8onam sequuntur, immobilia situm." Chancellor KENT lays down
the principle thus: "It has become a settled principle of inter-
national jurisprudence, and one founded on a comprehensive and
enlightened sense of public policy and convenience, that the dis-
position, succession to and distribution of personal property, wher-
ever situated, is governed by the law of the country of the owner's
or intestate's domicile at the time of his death, and not by the
conflicting laws of the various places where the goods happened to
be situated. The principle applies equally to cases of voluntary
transfer, of intestacy and of testaments: Stanley v. Bernes, 3
Hagg. Eccles. R. 878; _erraris v. Hertford, 8 Curteis 468 ; -Desse-
bats v. Berquier, 1 Binney 886. On the other hand, it is equally
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settled in the law of all civilized countries, that real property, as
to its tenure, mode of enjoyment, transfer and descent is to be
regulated by the lex loci rei ite :" 2 Kent's Com. 428, 429.
"The construction of wills," says Mr. Justice STORY, "as to
real property is to be given according to the lex rei sitce; and as
to personal property according to the lex domicilii, unless it be
manifest that the testator had the law of some other country in
view:" Story on Conflict of Laws, sect. 465, 474; ffarrison v.
Nixon, 9 Peters 503. See also Jarman on Wills, edit. Boston
1845, ch. 1, 1-10, where the numerous authorities are referred to.
Also, in Story's Confl. Laws, sects. 424, 428, the authorities,
foreign and domestic, are collected in favor of the proposition that
real property is exclusively governed by the territorial law of the
eitus. At the same time each state is competent to regulate within
its own territory that succession in personal and real property at
its pleasure: Id., sect. 23, 447; Jones v. Marable, 6 Humph.
116.
"The rule," says KENT, "as settled in England, and by the
general usage of nations, as to the succession and distribution of
personal property, has repeatedly been declared to constitute a part
of the municipal jurisprudence of this country :" 2 Kent's Com.
561-2. In proof of this he cites a whole string of cases.
Although an English lawyer has humorously observed that the
same person might, by the same court, be deemed legitimate as to
the real estate, and illegitimate as to the personal, and, we might
add, vice versa, "legitimate as to the mill, illegitimate as to the
machinery, born in wedlock as to the barn, but a bastard as to the
grain within it," yet, as before observed, it is not so much a
question of legitimacy or illegitimacy as of domicile and of
situs. If the deceased were domiciled, say, in Scotland, the suc-
cession would be determined according to the law of Scotland with
respect to land situated there, as well as with respect to personalty
situated there or elsewhere. If the deceased were domiciled in
England, such domicile would determine the succession to the per-
sonalty, but the realty, if situated in Scotland, would pass accord-
ing to the law of Scotland-otherwise, if situated in England. It
is true this indirectly raises the question of legitimacy, but so it
might indirectly raise the question of the validity of a divorce and
perhaps a subsequent marriage and resulting issue. This is the
inevitable result of a conflict of laws; but might not the attempt
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to reconcile this conflict result in further conflicting decisions,
making confusion even worse confounded? As an instance of
such complication by the law of Scotland, legitimation per subse-
quens matrimonium operates only from the time of the marriage,
not from the time of birth: Shedden v. Patrick, 1 Macq. 1. L.
Cas. 535.
In the case before us, the Court of Appeal, composed of JAMES,
COTTON and LUSH, L.JJ., the judgment of the Master of Rolls
was overruled, the two first-named judges being of opinion that the
status decides the question of legitimacy, and questions of status
depend on the law of domicile of origin, i. e., the place where the
parents were domiciled at the time of the child's birth, or where
they became subsequently domiciled. Their lordships cited Story
on the Conflict of Laws (paragraph 93), where he states that
foreign jurists generally, though not universally, maintain that
questions of legitimacy are to be decided exclusively by the law of
domicile of origin, and (paragraph 93, c.), that the same general
doctrine is avowedly adopted by the courts of England; in cor-
roboration of which he refers to the opinion of Lord STOWELL, in
Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, 2 Hagg. Const. Rep. 54, that, according
to the law of England, the status or condition of a claimant is
tried by reference to the law of the country where the status
originated. Lord Justice JAMES said that though heirship to land
depended on local law, the law of the country, the manor,- or even
the forma doni, kinship was an incident of the person and indi-
vidual. Lord Justice LUSH took the same view as Sir GEORGE
JESSEL (Master of the Rolls), viz. : that the right to succession in
the case of personalty was governed by the law of the domicile of
the deceased. Who shall decide when such doctors disagree ? It
seems very desirable that the House of Lords should determine
the issue so far as England is concerned, and it would be well if
an international congress could set the question at. rest for the
civilized world.
Even the Statute of Merton, now that aliens may inherit land
in England (33 & 34 Yict. c. 14, s. 2), might be so far modified
as to put real and personal property on the same footing in this
respect, one of the objects of that statute having been to exclude
the introduction of the foreign element in the descent of lands in
England. As was said by TINDAL, C. J., in delivering the unani-
mous opinion of the judges in the House of Lords, in Be Bert-
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whistle v. Fardill (supra) : "At the time of the passing of that
statute (Merton), Normandy, Aquitaine and Anjou belonged to
the crown of England. Many of the English nobles were of
foreign lineage, if not of foreign birth, and had possessions in those
countries as well as in this country. The civil law, which allowed
legitimation by subsequent matrimony, prevailed in those pro-
vinces, and it was of course a matter which much concerned these
nobles to determine by what rule the descent of their lands in
England should be governed. Yet, at the time of the passing of
the Statute of Merton, no words were introduced into. it to except
from its general provisions cases like the present; but the law was
allowed to be laid down broadly in the form in which it was now found
to exist." Under the head of "Who shall take advantage of the
trial of bastardy, &c.," (Rolle's Abridg., vol. 1, p. 732), there is
a case put of a man "1 born before marriage, and after the mar-
riage was had, the ordinary will not certify him to be a bastard,
but a mulier ;" this is said not to be "any estoppel, because he
may be a bastard by our law notwithstanding; but judgment shall
be given in the action in which the certificate is made, according
to the certificate" (40 Edw. III., 40). Such certificate of the
ordinary would of course relate only to personal property. It
would appear from this that so far as personalty was concerned, the
ordinary would not at this remote period certify that a man "born
before marriage," the marriage having been subsequently had, was
a bastard, and as the church never abated any oftits pretensions, and
such certification was deemed the "highest trial thereof" (Ibid.),
it seems but fair to presume that so long as the ordinary's cer-
tificate was required in matters of intestacy, just so long, at all
events, were the courts bound to act upon it, the person so certified
being "perpetually bound against all the world to avoid a con-
trary certification (Ibid.). The subject is fraught with difficulties,
and no means of reconciliation seems commensurate short of an
international understanding upon the interpretation of the foreign
status.
As an, instance of the conflicting character of the law of domi-
cile-where the father is a domiciled Scotchman, it is of no conse-
quence in what country his natural children have been born, or his
marriage with the mother of those children celebrated, neither
does it matter what the law of that country may have been in
regard to the legitimation per subsequens matrimonium, bit in
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such a case, it is the law of Scotland alone which must give the
rule in the question of legitimation, and that within Scotland at
least, and to all proper Scotch effects, the legitimation of the child
is unquestionably worked out by the mere fact of the subsequent
marriage. In McDouall v. Dalhousie, 10 Danl., Bell & Murray
6, the Scotch court, in giving judgment, said: "We are bound to
state that the place of the person's birth, or the law of that place
which would be applied to an English marriage and a domiciled
English husband, can form no bar to the operation of the settled
rule of the law of Scotland in relation to such a case as is now
before us. * * * In all the three cases of Shedden v. Patrick,
Strathmore and Ross, the judgments mainly proceeded on the
domicile of the parties; and in the last especially, the point of
indelibility from place of birth, was expressly waived by the Lord
Chancellor LYNDHURST. Judging, therefore, by all the light we
possess on the subject, our deliberate opinion is that above ex-
pressed." The decree of the Court of Session was affirmed by
the House of Lords 10th August 1840: 1 Robinson's Appeal C.
475, 491. The case of DeCoute, cited in Ross v. Ross (supra),
4 Wils. & Shaw 289, decided in France in 1668, established that
where a child is born in a country where he would become legiti-
mate by a subsequent marriage, he becomes so, although the mar-
riage has taken place in a country in which a different law prevails,
and where a subsequent marriage would not have the effect of ren-
dering him legitimate. That child was born in France, where that
law has effect; the parents afterwards came over to England, and
were married in England. The French court decided that the
effect of the marriage in England, although that law does not pre-
vail in England, was to render the child legitimate in France,
which is a complete confirmation of the principle that the personal
quality of a man must be decided by the law of the country in
which he was born. This case clearly establishes that neither the
law of the actual domicile of the parents, nor that of the place in
which their marriage was celebrated, determined the status of the
party, but that the capacity to become legitimated had been con-
ferred by the law of France. In the case of Shedden v. Patrick,
5 B. & C. 444; 4 Wils. & Shaw Appeal Cases 296, a native of
Scotland 'went to America, where he was domiciled; he lived there
for more than twenty years. He had a child there by a woman
whom he afterwards married in America. His father had a landed
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estate in Ayrshire, in Scotland, and the child, born previously to
the ceremony of marriage, claimed as heir. The court decided
against the legitimacy of the child, because by the law of the
country of its birth, the illegitimacy was indelible, and therefore a
subsequent marriage could not" have the effect of rendering the
child legitimate. New York was the domicile of the parents at
the time of the birth of the child, and also of their marriage.
The Strathmore Peerage case was the exact converse of Shedden
v. Patrick. In that case, Lord REDESDALE said of the claimant:
"The law that attached to him at his birth was the law of .Eng-
land;" and after referring to the Shedden Case, proceeds: "So I
apprehend that this child was born illegitimate according to the
law of the country in which he was born."
These cases evidence the difficulty of endeavoring to apply the
jus gentium in each individual instance. If, indeed, there were
any clearly defined international law on this subject, equally appli-
cable in every case, all difficulty would vanish. But as a departure
from the law of the domicile of a deceased would involve in every
instance an inquiry into the law of the domicile of origin, the
matrimonial domicile, the actual domicile of the parents at the
time of marriage, or the law of the country in which the property
is situated, the safer course seems that of resting on the law of
the domicile of a deceased except where the terms of a will indi-
cate a different intention.
In Boyes v. Bedale, 1 H. & M. 798; s. c. 10 L. T. Rep. (N. S.)
181 (supra), which came before Lord HATHERLEY, when Vice Chan-
cellor, it was decided that the children of a person domiciled in
England must mean the children according to English law, as dis-
tinguished from the children born before marriage, and which were
not legitimate according to English law. The vice chancellor pro-
ceeded to the length of saying: "I take it, that the language of
the Statute of Distributions would be dealt with in the same way.
If an intestate dies domiciled in England, the division of his pro-
perty is governed throughout by English law, and no person could
take by representation under that statute, unless legitimate by the
law of England." Again, in Be Wilson's Trusts (supra), KIN-
DERSLEY, V. C., says: "Now, the will being a will made in
England by an Englishman domiciled in England, must be con-
strued according to the law of England. Every term in it must
receive that interpretation which belongs to it according to
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English law. What is the interpretation which the law of Eng-
land gives to the term ' children'? Undoubtedly, children lawfully
begotten, ex justis nuptiis procreatus, unless indeed there be some-
thing in the context which satisfies the court that the testator
meant to use the expression in a different sense." This entirely
agrees with Story's definition.
So, evidently, the decision in Goodman v. Goodman (supra),
was based upon the testator's manifest intention, in addition to the
fact of his foreign domicile. It may be mentioned incidentally,
that the doctrine expressed by the words hcres ex justis nuptiig
procreatus, if strictly interpreted, would bastardize all children
procreated before the marriage of their parents, though born after,
but it is sufficient that the English law, by one of its many fic-
tions, takes refuge from the procreation in the certainty of birth.
Doubtless, up to the period of the Reformation, the bishop or
ordinary to whom was left the power of granting administration of
the goods of an intestate, although such power was regulated so
early as 31 Edw. III., c. 2, and such regulations were subsequently
extended to probate of wills by 21 Henry VIII., c. 5, -would act
upon the rule of the law of the church in certifying as to the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of those claiming to be next of kin, such
law knowing no distinction between foreign and domestic status in
the matter of ante nati children, and hence the question of foreign
domicile not arising. After the Reformation, and, perhaps, espe-
cially after the passing of the Statute of Distributions (22 & 23
Charles II.), the rule of the domicile of the intestate prevailed,
and this may be the origin of the application of the English rule
of legitimacy indiscriminately to foreign and domestic domicile
alike where the intestate's domicile was in that country. For
many reasons it may not be desirable to disturb the rule of lex loci
rei sitce regulating the succession to real property, although in the
United Kingdom it no longer forms a barrier to the, introduction
of foreigners, or quasi foreigners, to the inheritance of real estate;
and so far as domicile itself is concerned, the substitution of the
actual domicile, whether of origin or acquired, of the claimant, for
that of the deceased would appear to reconcile the status with the
vindication of the law of the country of such domicile. The
gravity of this subject will be more fully appreciated when it is
remembered that legitimation per subsequens matrimonium is
admitted with different modifications in Scotland, France, Spain,
